We consider reputation systems where users are allowed to rate products that they purchased previously. To obtain trustworthy reputations, they are allowed to rate these products only once. As long as they do so, the users stay anonymous. Everybody is able to detect users deviating from the rate-products-only-once policy and the anonymity of such dishonest users can be revoked by a system manager. In this paper we present formal models for such reputation systems and their security. Based on group signatures we design an efficient reputation system that meets all our requirements.
Introduction
Reputation systems are an increasingly popular tool to give providers and customers valuable information about previous transactions. To provide trustworthy, reliable, and honest ratings there is a need for anonymous reputation systems that also guarantee that customers rate products only once. To further increase trust in the system, everyone -even outsiders -should be able to verify the validity of ratings. In this paper, we propose models for secure and anonymous reputation systems and give an efficient construction of such a system. Some of the properties for reputation systems stated above have been studied in the context of group signatures, as defined in [4] for the static and in [5] for the dynamic case. However, the concept of group signatures does not meet all the requirements for reputation systems. In particular, reputation systems do not consist of a single group of users. Rather one can think of reputation systems as a family of group signature schemes -one for each product. Moreover, we may have providers with several products. Hence, when looking at security and anonymity group signature schemes for different products can not be considered in isolation. Finally, known constructions of group signatures do not provide all properties that we need for a secure and anonymous reputation system and do not provide them simultaneously.
Our Contribution. We define models for secure and anonymous reputation systems and give a first construction of such a system based on group signature schemes. We use the terms rating and message synonymously. Our construction provides anonymity, traceability, strongexculpability, verifier-local revocation, and public linkability. Anonymity means that signatures of honest users are indistinguishable. Traceability means that it is impossible for any set of colluding users to create ratings that can not be traced back to a user of the system. Strongexculpability means that nobody can produce signatures on behalf of honest users. A system has verifier-local revocation, if revocation messages only have to be sent to signature verifiers, but not to individual signers. Public linkability requires that anyone can decide whether or not two ratings for the same product were created by the same user, i.e. no secret key is required to link messages. Note that public linkability implies that users can only stay anonymous as long as they rate products just once. As a remark, it is well known how to realize the described properties in the context of group signatures, although not necessarily simultaneously. Our construction of a reputation system is based on the group signature scheme by Boneh, Boyen, and Shacham [6] (BBS) and the dynamic version of the scheme presented by Delerablée and Pointcheval [11] . These schemes already give us anonymity, traceability, and strongexculpability. To achieve verifier-local revocation we modify a technique by [26] . With the same technique we achieve public linkability. Note that anonymity of group signatures does not imply anonymity in our reputation system. This is due to the fact that providers control the groups corresponding to several products. Hence, they may combine information for different groups to violate anonymity. To prevent this, we need a system manager that contributes a trustworthy component to each group public key. In Section 3 we present a formal model for reputation systems. The security of our system can be shown in the random oracle model and is based on the Decision Linear Assumption and the q-SDH Assumption in bilinear groups. Figure 1 illustrates informally the architecture of our reputation system. Related Work. Reputation systems are a popular research topic in economics and computer science, see for example [2, 10, 12, 13, 19, 20] . Although privacy, i.e. anonymity and security, i.e. unforgeability, have been identified as key properties of reputation systems, no generally accepted privacy and security definitions for reputation systems have emerged. Definitions of anonymity based on differential privacy have been proposed in [10, 12, 28] . These are restricted to special reputation functions. In [2, 21, 25] cryptography has been proposed as a methodology to achieve anonymity in reputation systems, albeit without providing detailed definitions. In contrast to this, (anonymous) group signatures have been well studied in cryptography and formal security models exist. Important techniques to design group signature schemes were first described by Ateniese et al. [3] . For the case of static groups formal definitions of security were first given by Bellare, Micciancio and Warinschi [4] , for dynamic groups by Bellare, Shi and Zhang [5] . Both works provide frameworks to construct group signature schemes. One of the most efficient static schemes is that of Boneh, Boyen and Shacham [6] . Schemes with verifier-local revocation include [8, 26] , linkable, though not publicly linkable, group signature schemes include [18, 15, 24] . In the context of ring signatures different definitions of linkability have been considered before, for example in [16, 9, 29, 23] . Our definition of public linkability is based on the definition given in [16] .
Notation
Throughout this paper we will use the following notations. If S is a set, then |S| denotes its size. An empty string is denoted by ε. We distinguish three assignment operators. If x is a variable and y is an expression, then x := y denotes the assignment of the value of y to the variable x. If S is a finite set, then we write x $ ← S to indicate that an element x of S is picked uniformly at random. If A is an (probabilistic) algorithm running on inputs y 1 , y 2 , . . ., then x ←− A(y 1 , y 2 , . . .) denotes the operation of assigning the output of A to the variable x. The set of all possible outputs of an algorithm A with input y 1 , y 2 , . . . we denote by [A(y 1 , y 2 , . . .)]. If A and B are interactive algorithms, then the set of all possible outputs of the interactive algorithms A and B we denote by [A(y 1 , y 2 , . . .)] × [B(z 1 , z 2 , . . .)]. Running an algorithm A with inputs y 1 , y 2 , . . . and access to the oracles O 1 , O 2 , . . . we denote by A(y 1 , y 2 , . . . : O 1 , O 2 , . . .).
A Model for Reputation Systems
In this section we provide a model for reputation systems. This model is based on the model for dynamic group signature schemes by Bellare, Shi, and Zhang [5] . Therefore, we will use the same notation for the authorities, algorithms and security properties as Bellare, Shi, and Zhang.
Algorithms
Link(item, gmpk , ipk[item], (M , σ ), (M , σ )): This deterministic algorithm can be run by any user, even by an outsider, having access to the public ItemList, the group manager's public key gmpk and two message-signature pairs (M , σ ), (M , σ ), to obtain a bit . If Link outputs = 1, we call σ and σ publicly linkable signatures. Revoke(gmpk , gmsk , i): This deterministic algorithm is run by the group manager to revoke signers in case of misuse. Given the group manager's public key gmpk , the group manager's secret key gmsk and the identity of the group member to revoke, compute the revocation token grt[i] and add it to the public revocation list RL. Figure 2 illustrates the interaction of the described parties and the algorithms involved. It is not hard to see that the number of key issuers is not important in this model: a single key issuer has the same capabilities as a colluding set of key issuers. Therefore, in all formal definitions we will only consider the case that the number of key issuers is 1. Additionally, we assume that the signing keys from the key issuer given to a user are publicly verifiable, i.e. the correctness of keys can be checked using only public parameters.
Group/System Manager
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Key Issuer/Provider
Outsiders Verify, Link Figure 2 : Interaction of the parties within a reputation system.
Correctness: A reputation system must satisfy the following correctness requirements: 
Security Notions
To model the different attack capabilities of an adversary, we introduce certain oracles, which will be used in the definitions of security. The oracle definitions given in Figure 3 are based on [5] . Therefore, we assume that a security experiment has run KeyGen GM () to obtain (gmpk , gmsk ), and manages the global sets HU, CU, RU, J IU, GS, reg and ItemList. Except ItemList and reg all sets are only used within the formal definitions of Figure 3 and Figure 4 . With HU we denote the set of honest users, with CU the set of corrupted users. The set RU contains all identities of users that currently engage in the registration protocol. The set J IU contains all identities of users that currently engage in the join-issue protocol. With GS we denote the set of queried signatures. All sets are assumed to be initially empty. Using the write to identification list oracle an adversary can modify the secret signing key of user i ∈ N for the specified item. If gsk = ε the key information about user i is deleted from the list. Open(item, M, σ): The opening oracle can be used by the adversary with a message M , a signature σ and an item as arguments to get the output of the Open algorithm.
Using the oracle definitions from Figure 3 we can define the security experiments. In our reputation system we need anonymity, traceability, public linkability and strong-exculpability. The anonymity and traceability experiments are based on [5] , the public linkability experiment is based on [16] and the strong-exculpability experiment is based on [22, 3, 5] . The experiments are defined in Figure 4 . The probability is over the random bits of A, as well as the random bits used in the experiment. We call RS (t, ε)−anonymous, iff for every algorithm A running in time at most t the advantage Adv Exp anon−b A,RS (k) is at most ε.
The anonymity requirements can slightly be relaxed to an experiment where an adversary is not allowed to query the Open oracle. We denote this modification by CPA-anonymity and the anonymity experiment as defined in Figure 4 by CCA2-anonymity, analogously to [6] .
Definition 3.2:
Let RS be a reputation system. We denote the advantage of an algorithm A in solving Exp publink A,RS (k) by Adv Exp publink A,RS (k) def = Pr Exp publink A,RS (k) = 1 . The probability is over the random bits of A, as well as the random bits used in the experiment. We call RS (t, ε)−public linkable, iff for every algorithm A running in time at most t the advantage Adv Exp publink A,RS (k) is at most ε.
AddU(i): // everybody
If (i ∈ HU ∪ CU ) then return ε. 
Definition 3.3:
Let RS be a reputation system. We denote the advantage of an algorithm A in solving Exp trace A,RS (k) by
The probability is over the random bits of A, as well as the random bits used in the experiment. We call RS (t, ε)−strong-exculpable, iff for every algorithm A running in time at most t the advantage Adv Exp str−ex A,RS (k) is at most ε.
Discussion:
The anonymity experiment Exp anon−b A,RS (k) asks an adversary to distinguish which of two group members signed a message for some item, where the identities, the message, and the item were chosen by the adversary. The adversary's attack capabilities are strong: it is possible to corrupt the key issuer and all but two users. These two users must be honest because otherwise the adversary could possibly link different signatures or use the revocation token of the users to determine their identities. The strong-exculpability experiment Exp str−ex A,RS (k) asks an adversary to output a messagesignature pair, for some item chosen by the adversary, which is valid and can be traced back to an honest user. We give an adversary the possibility to corrupt users and the key issuer, so the attack capabilities are very strong. Because the key issuer can always generate signing keys for non-existing users, we force the adversary to output a signature on behalf of an honest user. The public linkability experiment Exp publink A,RS (k) asks an adversary to output message-signature pairs, for the same item chosen by the adversary, such that all pairs are valid and there are no two pairs that can be linked. The number of pairs must be one more than the number of users in the group. We allow the adversary to corrupt all users, but the key issuer has to be honest. If the key issuer is corrupted, then he can create signing keys for non-existing users. Hence, he can also create signatures which can not be linked to signatures created by the group members. The traceability experiment Exp trace A,RS (k) asks an adversary to output a message-signature pair, for some item chosen by the adversary, which is valid but can not be traced back to a corrupted user. In this experiment the key issuer must be honest because he could generate signing keys for non-existing users.
Discussion: The defined experiments imply two different attack scenarios:
In the first scenario, for anonymity and strong-exculpability, we allow an adversary to corrupt the key issuer and a set of users. One could argue, that there is an oracle missing to allow an adversary to send corrupted data to honest users in the join-issue protocol. But this functionality is covered by the SndToGM, WItemList, and WIdentList oracles. Due to the assumption that all signing keys are publicly verifiable by the users (as stated in Subsection 3.1), an honest user would only accept valid keys in the join-issue protocol. The same is implicitly done by our oracles and in the experiments. Hence, we omit such an oracle.
In the second scenario, for public linkability and traceability, key issuers are assumed to be honest, whereas a set of users can be corrupted. In particular, this implies that users and key issuers are disjoint sets. The restriction to honest key issuers is necessary because a corrupted key issuer could generate secret keys for non-existing users. With an appropriate identity management this can be prevented and we could also allow corrupted key issuers in the experiments for public linkability and traceability.
An important issue is that of timing the operations. The key issuer may correlate transactions and ratings by their timing, thereby threatening the anonymity of users. Hence, our reputation systems needs a mechanism to prevent such attacks. In [10] , [21] , and [17] different solutions to this problem are proposed, which can be incorporated into our construction.
Preliminaries
In this section we introduce the main building blocks for our reputation system.
Bilinear Maps
First we review some concepts related to bilinear maps, following the notation of [7]:
1. G 1 and G 2 are multiplicative groups of prime order p, 2. ψ is an isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 , 3. g 1 is a generator of G 1 and g 2 is a generator of G 2 , with g 1 = ψ(g 2 ), and 4. e is a map e : G 1 × G 2 −→ G T with the following properties:
We say the groups (G 1 , G 2 ) as described above are bilinear groups, iff the group operations in G 1 and G 2 , the isomorphism ψ and the mapping e are efficiently computable.
Computational Assumptions
Here we introduce the computational assumptions we use to prove the security of our reputation system. Since these assumptions are standard, we can be brief. 
The probability is over the uniform choices of the parameters u, v, w, α, β, γ and over the random bits of A. We say that algorithm A (t, ε)-decides D-Linear1 if A runs in time at most t and Adv D−Linear1 A is at least ε. We say that D-Linear1 (t, ε)-holds in G if no algorithm running in time t has advantage at least ε in solving D-Linear1 in G. 
Definition 4.3 -q-Strong Diffie-Hellman Problem -q-SDH: Let G 1 , G 2 be two (multiplicative) groups of prime order p (where possibly G 1 = G 2 ), let ψ be an efficiently computable isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 , let g 2 ∈ G 2 be an arbitrary generator and let g 1 = ψ(g 2 ). Given a (q + 2)-tuple (g 1 , g 2 , g γ 2 , g
), the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman
Problem is to output a pair g
The probability is over the uniform choices of the parameters g 2 , γ and over the random bits of A. We say that algorithm
Definition 4.5 -extended q-Strong Diffie-Hellman Problem -extended q-SDH: Let G 1 , G 2 be two (multiplicative) groups of prime order p (where possibly G 1 = G 2 ), let ψ be an efficiently computable isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 , let g 2 ∈ G 2 be arbitrary generator, let g 1 = ψ(g 2 ) and h
, the extended q-Strong Diffie-Hellman Problem is to output a tuple (
Definition 4.6:
The advantage of an algorithm A in solving extended q-SDH in (
The probability is over the uniform choices of the parameters h, g 2 , γ and over the random bits of A. We say that algorithm A (t, ε)-solves extended q-SDH in (G 1 , G 2 ) if A runs in time at most t and Adv ext−q−SDH A is at least ε. We say that extended q-SDH (t, ε)-holds in (G 1 , G 2 ) if no algorithm running in time t has advantage at least ε in solving extended q-SDH in (G 1 , G 2 ).
Lemma 4.2:
Let G 1 , G 2 be two cyclic groups of prime order p and let A be an algorithm that (t , ε )-solves extended q-SDH in (G 1 , G 2 ). Then there exists an algorithm B that (t, ε)-solves q-SDH in
x+γ , x, y to this problem with advantage ε. Now B computes
x as a solution to his q-SDH problem with advantage ε in time
A Zero-Knowledge protocol for extended q-SDH -Intuition to the Reputation System
We give a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge to prove possession of a solution to an extended q-SDH problem. That means, the prover has to show that he knows a triple (A, x, y) such that A x+γ = g 1 · h y , where A, g 1 , h ∈ G 1 and x, y, γ ∈ Z p (here the γ is not known by the prover). We assume to have an efficiently computable isomorphism ψ from G 2 to G 1 and an efficiently computable non-degenerative bilinear mapping e : G 1 × G 2 → G T . The groups G 1 , G 2 , G T are groups of prime order p. Furthermore, we assume that the Decision Linear Problem holds in G 1 .
The secret key of the prover is the triple (A, x, y), the public values are
x+γ , but can not be computed by the prover because γ is unknown. The triple (A, x, y) is a solution of the extended q-SDH problem, iff the equation e(A, g 2 ) x · e(A, W ) · e(h, g 2 ) −y = e(g 1 , g 2 ) holds. This will be used in the protocol.
Protocol 5.1:
T 5 := f µ+y , δ 1 := x · α, and δ 2 := x · β. Now P and V undertake a proof of knowledge of values (α, β, x, y, µ, δ 1 , δ 2 ). 4. The prover computes s α := r α + c · α, s β := r β + c · β, s x := r x + c · x, s y := r y + c · y, s µ := r µ + c · µ, s δ 1 := r δ 1 + c · δ 1 , s δ 2 := r δ 2 + c · δ 2 and sends them to the verifier V.
P chooses
r α , r β , r x , r y , r µ , r δ 1 , r δ 2 $ ← Z p , computes R 1 := u rα , R 2 := v r β , R 3 := e(T 3 , g 2 ) rx · e(w, W ) −rα−r β · e(w, g 2 ) −r δ 1 −r δ 2 · e(h, g 2 ) −ry , R 4 := T rx 1 · u −r δ 1 , R 5 := T rx 2 · v −r δ 2 ,
5.
The verifier V checks the following equations:
and accepts if all hold.
Lemma 5.1:
The Protocol 5.1 is complete (the verifier always accepts an interaction with an honest prover).
Proof. If the prover P is honest and in possession of a triple (A, x, y) such that A x+γ = g 1 ·h y , he follows the computations specified for him in the protocol. In this case the following equations hold:
So the verifier will always accept when the prover is honest.
Lemma 5.2:
Assuming the Decision Linear Problem holds in G 1 , transcripts of Protocol 5.1 can be simulated.
Proof. We describe a simulator that outputs transcripts for Protocol 5.1 that are indistinguishable from real protocol transcripts.
In the first step the simulator choosesÂ 
using the verification equations from Protocol 5.1 and outputs (T 1 , 
is distributed as in the real protocol. Using a standard hybrid argument, it follows that transcripts generated by the simulator are indistinguishable from transcripts of the real protocol, assuming the Decision Linear Problem holds in G 1 .
Lemma 5.3:
The Protocol 5.1 is a proof of knowledge (there exists an extractor for this protocol).
Proof. Suppose an algorithm E (the extractor) that is given two transcripts of protocol 5.1 (T 1 , Dividing the two instances for each of the verification equations gives
= e(T 3 , g 2 ) ∆sx · e(w, W ) −∆sα−∆s β · e(w, g 2 ) −∆s δ 1 −∆s δ 2 · e(h, g 2 ) −∆sy · e(T 3 , W ) ∆c e(g 1 , g 2 ) ∆c ⇐⇒ e(g 1 , g 2 ) e(T 3 , W ) ∆c = e(T 3 , g 2 ) ∆sx · e(w, W ) −∆sα−∆s β · e(w, g 2 ) −∆s δ 1 −∆s δ 2 · e(h, g 2 ) −∆sy taking ∆c-th root and lettingx = ∆sx ∆c we obtain e(g 1 , g 2 ) e(T 3 , W ) = e(T 3 , g 2 )x · e(w, W ) −α−β · e(w, g 2 ) −α·x−β·x · e(h, g 2 ) −ŷ this can be rearranged as
Hence, the extractor obtains a tuple (Â,x,ŷ), which is a valid extended q-SDH triple. Moreover, theÂ is exactly the same as that in the Linear Encryption (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 ), theŷ is the same as in T 5 and so alsox is the same as in the transcripts. So the extractor gets exactly the same values the prover knows.
Our Construction
In this section we define our reputation system based on extended q-SDH and D-Linear1.
To give some intuition for this system we provide an honest-verifier zero-knowledge proof of knowledge in Section 5.
The Reputation System
We apply the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [14, 1] on Protocol 5.1 to obtain a signature of knowledge which is secure in the random oracle model. By extending this signature scheme we construct a reputation system. We use the challenge c as a part of the signature rather than the values R 1 , . . . , R 7 , modelling the value c as the output of a random oracle. This technique is widely used in the context of group signatures [6, 8, 3] . In a reputation system, the key issuer publishes items for which the signatures are created. Every user can create a single signature for every item without losing anonymity. Due to the public linkability two signatures for one item by the same user can be detected. In such a case, the anonymity of the cheating user is revoked by the group manager. By publishing a revocation token the group manager can declare signatures from the cheating user as invalid. This invalidity can be checked by every verifier using verifier-local revocation [8, 26] . We assume the communication between users and the group manager and between users and the key issuer to take place via secure channels. Furthermore, the user's public key upk [i] is certified by the group manager, such that the key issuer can verify the integrity of the public keys during the Join-Issue protocol.
In the following definitions we consider bilinear groups G 1 and G 2 , and two hash functions modeled as random oracles: H : {0, 1} * −→ Z p and H 1 : {0, 1} * −→ G 2 . Furthermore, as in [6] , we use Linear Encryption -a CPA-secure Elgamal-like encryption scheme based on the Decision Linear Problem (Definition 4.1).
KeyGen GM ():
The group manager's key generation algorithm proceeds as follows:
The values (u, v, w) are the public key of the Linear Encryption, the values (ξ 1 , ξ 2 ) are the corresponding secret key. KeyGen KI (item):
Selectd
The key issuer's key generation algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. Select g 2 item $ ← G 2 and set g 1 item := ψ(g 2 item ).
Select γ item
$ ← Z p and set W item := g γ item 2 item . 3. Add the item-based public key ipk [item] :=(g 1 item , g 2 item , W item ) to the ItemList and keep isk [item] := γ item secret as the item-based secret key.
KeyGen U (i):
The user's key generation algorithm proceeds as follows: The interactive registration protocol proceeds as follows:
1. The user sends his identity i to the group manager. 
The group signing algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. Obtain the valuef ∈ G 2 byf := H 1 (item).
Choose α, β, µ
and the helper values δ 1 := α · x i item and δ 2 := β · x i item .
3. Choose r α , r β , r x , r y , r µ , r δ 1 , r δ 2 $ ← Z p and compute The signature verification algorithm proceeds as follows:
The verifier computes
3. Check that the challenge c is correct:
If this holds, then accept, otherwise reject. The public linking algorithm proceeds as follows:
For each element
1. At first, check that σ is a valid signature for message M and that σ is a valid signature for message M . If not, output 0.
2. Obtain the valuef ∈ G 2 byf := H 1 (item). The opening algorithm proceeds as follows:
Output 1, if e
1. Check that σ is a valid signature of knowledge for message M . If not, output failure.
Compute
using the group manager's secret key.
3. The group manager looks up the user index i from the identification list IL item .
4. If no entry for A i item can be found in IL item return failure, otherwise return i.
Remarks:
We assume the communication between users and the group manager and between users and the key issuer to take place via secure channels. Furthermore, the user's public key upk [i] is certified by the group manager, such that the key issuer can verify the integrity of the public keys during the join-issue protocol. Since we assume the group manager to be honest, we can let him choose the user's public and secret keys. We need the honest group manager to prove security for the system.
Correctness:
The correctness of the reputation system can be shown as follows:
• Protocol 5.1 is correct, i.e. every honestly created signature will be declared as valid.
• Revocation token are computed correctly.
• For honestly created signatures the group manager can always recover the identity of the signer, because of the correctness of the Linear Encryption.
• Two signatures for the same item by the same user are declared as publicly linked.
• Every secret signing key gsk [i] created by the key issuer can be publicly verified by e(A i item , g 2 ) x i item · e(A i item , W ) · e(h, g 2 ) −y i ? = e(g 1 , g 2 ).
Security of the Reputation System
As mentioned in Section 3 the anonymity experiment as defined in Figure 4 can be relaxed to CPA-anonymity. We will prove security in this slightly weaker model, analogously to [6] . In the following lemmata Q is the overall number of oracle queries made by the adversary. The proofs of security are all in the random oracle model.
Lemma 6.1:
If D-Linear1 (t , ε )-holds in G 2 , then the reputation system defined in Section 6 is (t, Q, q H 1 , q AU , ε)-CPA-anonymous, where t = t − Q · O(1) and ε = ε · 2 · q AU · q H 1 . Here q H 1 is the number of hash oracle queries to H 1 and q AU is the number of AddU oracle queries.
Proof. Suppose A is an adversary that (t, ε)-breaks the anonymity of the reputation system. Then we can construct an adversary B that decides D-Linear1 in G 2 with advantage at least
Algorithm B is given an instance of the Decision Linear Problem (û,v,ŵ,ûâ,vb,ŵĉ) ∈ G 6 2 and has to decide whetherĉ =â +b holds. B does so by interacting with algorithm A. At first, B sets HU := ∅, CU := ∅, RL := ∅, ItemList := ∅, reg := ∅, RU := ∅, J IU := ∅, GS := ∅ and computes a second, independent instance of D-Linear1 (ĥ,d,f ,ĥ y * ,d µ * ,f r * ) using the standard random self-reducibility technique (see Lemma 4.1) . Although A has to output two identities in his anonymity challenge, it suffices for B to guess one identity, namely the one that is used in the challenge signature. Identities are created using the AddU oracle, and there are at most q AU queries to this oracle. Hence, B chooses 1 $ ←{1, . . . , q AU } as his guess which identity can be used for A's challenge. Analogously, B has to guess for which item A wants to be challenged. For every item the hash value H 1 (item) is needed to create a signature, and there are at most q H 1 queries to H 1 . Hence, B chooses 2 $ ←{1, . . . , q H 1 } as his guess that the 2 'th query to H 1 is for the item that A wants to be challenged on. Figure 3 . If i = i * then B cannot respond as usk [i * ] = y * is not known and d y * can not be computed. Hence, B declares failure and exits. GSig(i, item, M ): Algorithm B has to handle three different cases:
• If i = i * then B responds as defined in Figure 3 .
• If i = i * ∧ H 1 (item) =f then B simulates the signature using the simulator of Lemma 5.2.
To do this, B checks that i is an honest user, that there exists a public key for the given item in the ItemList, and that user i owns a personal signing key gsk At some point A outputs a tuple (i 0 , i 1 , item, M, St). If i 0 or i 1 are not honest users or the specified item does not exist in the ItemList, then B declares failure and exits. Also, B declares failure and exits, if i b = i * or H 1 (item) =f . Otherwise, the challenge is computed as follows: B sets T 1 := ψ(ûâ), T 2 := ψ(vb), T 3 := A i * item · ψ(ŵĉ), T 4 := ψ(d µ * ), T 5 := ψ(f r * ) and simulates the values (c, s α , s β , s x , s y , s µ , s δ 1 , s δ 2 ) as described in the GSig oracle. If this causes a collision during the simulation of the hash value c, B declares failure and exits. Otherwise, the challenge signature is given to A.
In the guess-phase B responds to A's queries to the oracles as before. When A outputs it's guess b ∈ {0, 1} B outputs 1, iff i b = i * as his guess for his D-Linear1 challenge. All keys given to A and the responses to A's queries are properly distributed, except the completely simulated signatures, but these can not be distinguished from real signatures, assuming D-Linear1 holds. Now we analyze the advantage of B in deciding D-Linear1 in G 2 . Suppose the D-Linear1 instance given to B is a real D-Linear1 tuple, i.e.ĉ =â +b. Then also r * = y * + µ * and the challenge signature is a valid signature of user i b . Hence, A has advantage ε in breaking the anonymity of the reputation system. Suppose the D-Linear1 instance given to B is a random instance, i.e.ĉ $ ← Z p . Then also r * $ ← Z p and the challenge signature is completely independent of i b . Hence, algorithm A's advantage is 0. If B guesses the correct identity i * and the correct item for the challenge signature, then B will not abort. Guessing the correct identity i * happens with a probability of at least 1 q AU . Analogously, guessing the correct item happens with a probability of at least 1 q H 1 . Hence, B outputs a guess for his D-Linear1 challenge with a probability of at least 
Lemma 6.2:
If q-SDH (t , ε )-holds in (G 1 , G 2 ), then the reputation system defined in Section 6 is (t, ε)publicly linkable, where t = t − Q · O(1) and ε = q AI · 32 · q H · (q − 1) · ε + q AI p . Furthermore, the overall number of oracle queries to SndToGM must be at most q − 1. Here q H is the number of hash function queries to H, q AI is the number of oracle queries to the AddItem oracle made by the adversary and p is the size of the groups G 1 and G 2 .
Proof. Suppose A is an adversary that (t, ε)-breaks the public linkability of the reputation system. Then we can construct an adversary B that solves q-SDH in (G 1 , G 2 ) with advantage ε of at least ε = ε q AI − 1
. Without loss of generality we assume that A creates exactly q − 1 users via the SndToGM oracle. Algorithm B is given an instance of the q-SDH problem G 1 , G 2 , Gγ 2 , . . . , G
. . , q − 1} and sets γ :=γ − x k which is unknown. Then the following values are computed by B:
All products in the exponents are polynomials ofγ of degree at most q. By expanding the products all the specified values can be computed using the given q-SDH instance. With γ :=γ − x k , the value W equals g γ 2 , while γ is unknown to B. To generate the group manager's public key, B selects w ((m 1 , σ 1 ) , . . . , (m q , σ q )). If item = item * , at least one signature is invalid or there are at least two publicly linkable signatures then B declares failure and exits. Otherwise, B computes the revocation tokens grt[i] = d y i for all q − 1 group members, adds them to the revocation list RL and runs the verification algorithm for every message-signature pair (m i , σ i ), i = 1, . . . , q. Since the signatures are not publicly linkable, there must be at least one message-signature pair (m i * , σ i * ) such that σ i * is still a valid signature. Now we apply the Forking Lemma [27] to obtain a second solution to the linkability experiment which can be used to solve q-SDH. A run of B interacting with A is completely described by the randomness string ω used by A and B, and by the vectors ρ H , ρ H 1 of responses made by the random oracles H and H 1 . We assume that the random oracle queries by A are distinct and we denote the i'th query to H by q i H and the i'th query to H 1 by q i H 1 . The response to q i H is denoted by ρ i H , the response to q i H 1 is denoted by ρ i H 1 . Hence, a random choice of ρ H and ρ H 1 exactly corresponds to the random choices of H and H 1 . From here on, we abbreviate signatures as (m, σ 0 , c, σ 1 ), where
and c is the value derived by the random oracle H on input (m, σ 0 ). The values omitted in the signature can be computed according to the equations used in the Verify algorithm. For a random choice of (ω, ρ H 1 , ρ H ) algorithm A outputs a solution to the public linkability experiment with advantage ε. With probability 1 q AI this solution is for item * . For the messagesignature pair (m i * , σ i * ) = (m i * , σ 0 i * , c, σ 1 i * ) the probability that c equals H(m i * , σ 0 i * ) is 1 p , unless it has been queried during the attack. Because this probability is negligable it is likely that A queried H(m i * , σ 0 i * With these definitions, ν := Pr(S) = ε q AI − 1 p is the probability that A is succesful, H(m i * , σ 0 i * ) was queried by A and (m i * , σ 0 i * , c, σ 1 i * ) is a signature for item * . Now let I be the set of the most likely indices i:
Then
Let ρ H | b a denote the restriction of ρ H to its elements ρ a H , ρ a+1 H , . . . , ρ b H and let us define the sets
Then Pr(S j ) = Pr(S j ) · Pr(S | S j ) = Pr(S) · Pr(S j | S) ≥ ν 2·q H and Pr(Ω j | S j ) ≥ 1 2 , by the splitting lemma [27] . Furthermore, it holds
because the subsets S j are disjoint. This means, with probability ν 4 algorithm A succeeds by outputting a signature (m i * , σ 0 i * , c, σ 1 i * ), which is derived from a tuple (x, y) ∈ Ω j for some j ∈ I. Now we rewind A and B to the j'th query to H and proceed with an oracle vector ρ H , where
Hence, A succeeds a second time by outputting a signature (m i * , σ 0 i * , c , σ 1 i * ) where c = c and σ 1 i * = σ 1 i * (of course, A again outputs q message-signaute pairs, but we are only interested in the one with index i * ). By using the extractor of Lemma 5.3, we obtain from (σ 0 i * , c, σ 1 i * ) and (σ 0 i * , c , σ 1 i * ) a q-SDH tuple (A * , x * , y * ). This can be transformed into a solution to B's q-SDH problem as follows:
Let f (X) :=
for some polynomials τ and τ of degree at most q − 2, where β or β equals 0, iff (γ − x k + x * ) is a factor of f (γ) or g(γ). These cases will be discussed later. Using this representation we obtain
and we can define
Hence, (A, x * − x k ) is a solution to B's q-SDH problem. Now we discuss the different cases that can occur during the described transformation. Case 3: x * ∈ {x j } q−1 j=1 : This case has to be devided into two different subcases: a) x * = x k : Since x * is equal to x j for some j = k, (γ − x k + x j ) is a factor of both polynoms f (γ) and g(γ). Hence, it holds β = β = 0, A cannot be computed and B has to abort.
b) x * = x k : In this case (γ − x k + x * ) =γ is a factor of f (γ), but not one of g(γ). Hence, β = 0 and β = 0 holds. Also y * = y k (because otherwise A * would be equal to A k ) and (y * − y k ) · β = 0 holds, so (A, 0) is a solution to B's q-SDH problem.
We know that B obtains a tuple (A * , x * , y * ) with a probability of at least ν 2 16·q H . Because A was successful it holds y * / ∈ {y i } q−1 i=1 . Hence, case 1 does not occur. If case 2 occurs, B can compute a solution to its q-SDH problem with probability 1. For case 3 Pr(x * = x k ) = 1 q−1 holds and either case 2 or case 3 occurs with a probability of at least 1 2 . Putting all together, assuming the more pessimistic scenario of case 3, B can compute a solution to its q-SDH problem with a probability ε of at least
.
The transformation of B's q-SDH instance into q −1 tuples (A j , x j , y j ) and an item-based public key can be done in constant time, for fixed q. Also algorithm B can respond to an oracle query of A in constant time, and there are at most Q of such queries. The computation of (A, x) using the extracted values (A * , x * , y * ) needs constant time, too. Hence, B can solve q-SDH in time t = t + Q · O(1).
Lemma 6.3:
If q-SDH (t , ε )-holds in (G 1 , G 2 ), then the reputation system defined in Section 6 is (t, ε)-
Here q AU is the number of oracle queries to AddU, q AI is the number of oracle queries to AddItem, the number of oracle queries to SndToGM is a most q − 1 − q AU , q H is the number of queries to the random oracle H and p is the size of the groups G 1 and G 2 .
• If (b = I) ∨ (b = II ∧ (i = i * ∨ item = item * )) then B responds as defined in Figure 3 .
If for an honest user i the signing key gsk [i, item] is empty, such a key can be generated, before the signature is created. If item = item * the tuple (A j , x j , y j ) corresponding to usk [i] = y j has to be used as secret signing key.
• If b = II, i = i * and item = item * then B simulates the signature using the simulator of For a Type-I forger the environment is simulated perfectly, because B knows all secret and public keys. Hence, B is always able to compute correct and properly distributed responses to A's queries and A outputs a valid forgery (item * , m * , σ * ), for the guessed item * , with a probability of at least ε q AI . For a Type-II forger the environment is simulated perfectly unless A queries the USK oracle for user i * or a collision occurs while simulating a signature (since the probability of such a collision is negligable we will ignore it in the analysis). Hence, A outputs a valid forgery (item * , m * , σ * ), for the guessed item * , that traces to i * with a probability of at least ε q AI ·q AU . Now we apply the Forking Lemma [27] to obtain a second solution to the traceability experiment which can be used to solve q-SDH. The needed technique is exactly the same as in the proof of public linkability in Lemma 6.2. That means, with ν = ε q AI − 1 p for a Type-I forger and ν = ε q AI ·q AU − 1 p for a Type-II forger, we obtain a q-SDH tuple (A * .x * , y * ) with a probability of at least ν 2 16·q H . This tuple is not one of the tuples B created, because otherwise the forger would not be successful. Hence, either case 2 or case 3 described in Lemma 6.2 occurs with a probability of at least 1 2 . Moreover, B guesses the correct forger type with a probability of at least 1 2 and can compute a solution (A, x) to its q-SDH problem with a probability ε of at least
assuming the more pessimistic scenario of case 3 and a Type-II forger. As shown in Lemma 6.2, the transformation of B's q-SDH instance can be done in constant time, for fixed q. Also algorithm B can respond to an oracle query of A in constant time, and there are at most Q of such queries. The computation of (A, x) using the extracted values (A * , x * , y * ) needs constant time, too. Hence, B can solve q-SDH in time t = t + Q · O(1).
Lemma 6.4:
If the discrete logarithm problem is (t , ε )-hard in G 2 , then the reputation system defined in Section 6 is (t, ε)-strong exculpable, where t = t − Q · O(1) and ε = q AU · √ ε · 16 · q H + q AU p . Here q AU is the number of oracle queries made by the adversary to AddU, q H is the number of queries to the random oracle H and p is the size of the groups G 1 and G 2 .
Proof. Suppose A is an adversary that (t, ε)-breaks the strong-exculpability of the reputation system above. Then we construct an adversary B that solves the discrete logarithm problem in G 2 with advantage at least ε = ε q AU − 1 p 2 · 1 16·q H in time t = t + Q · O(1). B sets HU := ∅, CU := ∅, RL := ∅, ItemList := ∅, reg := ∅, RU := ∅, J IU := ∅, GS := ∅ and guesses the user i * for which the adversary A will output a signature σ as its solution to the strongexculpability experiment. This can be done by choosing i * $ ←{1, ..., q AU } and handling the i * -th query to the GSig, USK, RevU, and AddU oracles appropriately. The proof is divided into three parts. In the first part of the proof, we describe a simulation for B interacting with A. Setup: B is given (ĥ, D) as an instance of the discrete logarithm problem in G 2 , whereĥ In the second part of the proof, we analyze the simulation above. Except for USK and GSig, B can answer all queries exactly as defined in Figure 3 . Hence, the simulation is perfect, unless A queries the USK oracle for user i * . In case i = i * the signing oracle GSig produces signatures by following the signing algorithm. Hence, those signatures are properly distributed. In case i = i * the signature is obtain by the simulator of Protocol 5.1. T 1 , T 2 , T 3 ,T 4 , and T 5 are properly distributed, so by using the simulator with these values, we obtain a signature σ that is distributed as in the real reputation scheme. Hence, the probability that A outputs a valid signature σ for an honest user is ε. The probability that this signature traces to user i * is at least ε q AU . In the third part of this proof, we use the Forking Lemma [27] to obtain a solution for the discrete logarithm problem. The technique is exactly the same as in the proof of public linkability (Lemma 6.2). Using the Forking Lemma one can compute two forged signatures (σ 0 , c, σ 1 ) and (σ 0 , c , σ 1 ) that trace to the honest user i * with probability
Using the extractor from Lemma 5.3, we obtain a triple (A, x, y), where y is the secret key corresponding to i * 's public key upk [i * ] = ψ(D). Hence y = log h (ψ(D)), and y = logĥ(D), as required. Algorithm B can respond to an oracle query of A in constant time, and there are at most Q of such queries. The computation of (A, x, y) needs constant time, too. Hence, B can solve the discrete logarithm problem in time t = t + Q · O(1).
